Von Tirpitz Coastal Battery Of German Artillery Though the German army never had a system of fortifications equivalent to the vast places fortes on the French frontier, see previous blogs, their defensive structures developed quickly up to and including the 1914-18 war. They had 60cm railways in readiness for offensive warfare which were quickly adapted for trench supply. Their trench systems were well designed. A whole blog post should be given over to the matter. This blog focusses on one particular system, a battery designed to harry Channel shipping and protect their trenches.

The photograph shows its importance; it has attracted heavy naval shelling as can be seen from all the craters. It was supplied by a double-track 60 centimetre (the term used by 'Illustration') railway just visible running along in front of the four circular gun emplacements. A description of this fortification at Ostend appeared in ‘Illustration’ Magazine in November 1918. The writing is partisan, but interesting. The journalist slithers between admiration for the brave poilus who retook the massive fort – implying great courage - and contempt for the Germans. They were at once stupid to his mind and also crafty and underhand. I’ll give you the flavour of his account and get in some mention of 60cm railways. 60cm is the English translation of voie de 60 which is the more normal French name for that railway gauge. Yet it was not used in this French language publication. The reasons for these linguistic gymnastics deserve a blog to themselves. The ‘Illustration’ article centres round the von Tirpitz gun battery, the most westerly of a chain along the coast of occupied Belgium. It was particularly well-placed for its job and was named for Admiral von Tirpitz who is (dis) credited with devising total submarine warfare. This doctrine basically identified all ships, including civilian even if owned and operated by neutral countries, as combatants if they were even partially involved in Allied trade. This doctrine hurt the Allies who were supplied by sea more than were the Central Powers. Threats to respond in kind were no taken too seriously.

The map showing the coast from Ostend to Dunkirk places the von Tirpitz battery in the south-west suburbs of Ostend. Its armaments had a range of 25 kilometres. Thus it threatened both Channel shipping and the Yser front, where the trench systems of both belligerents met the North Sea. The local soil was sandy, both good and bad for construction; good because earth sheltering was relatively easy to arrange, not so good because deep foundations for walls and platforms were necessary. The complex took nearly a year to construct but after that, as long as repairs and improvements continued, it was nearly impregnable. The long range was possible because of its 280mm naval guns, four in all. Of its many targets, Nieuport, on the French side of the Yser Front, was most affected but the port of La Panne was also vulnerable. The guns had a network of observers based at ‘telemeters’ - literally distance measurers. These tall masts were observation points for range-finding. The photo shows one lying across its concrete base; you can see the camouflage paint quite clearly. A common gibe levelled at the Germans of 14-18 was that they didn’t understand camouflage. If they didn’t at the beginning of the war, they were fast learners. In the centre background of the photo, another mast which is still upright can be seen. Two soldiers in the foreground give an idea of scale.

The four gun emplacements were circular concrete enclosures 15 metres in diameter and approximately 4 metres deep. See the aerial photo above. The concrete helped shelter the operators. The guns, manoeuvred by electric motors, were designed for different angles of fire. Those with a higher angle of fire, two out of every four, were in slightly deeper enclosures. The photo below shows the arrangement. A gun is pointing straight at the cameraman, the second is pointing up. To each side of these enclosures were earth sheltered ammunition stores, also protected by 2 metres of concrete. They were supplied by a double-tracked 60cm railway, an example of the Heeresfeldbahn, German military narrow gauge.

The Prussian Army had kept an eye on developments in Wales where the Festiniog Railway used 2’ gauge to great effect. In the 1870s, however, German narrow gauge concentrated on metre gauge with 750 mm a poor second. By 1882, they were looking carefully at the military narrow gauge devised by Paul Decauville and their establishments at Sperenberg conducted trials with 600 and 720mm gauge. In the meantime, Prosper Péchot had devised his voie de 60 military system. By 1886, trials were taking place at the fortifications around Toul, in those days, near the German frontier. By the following year, Prussian Army research concentrated on horse-drawn 60cm gauge and the year after, when the Péchot-Bourdon locomotive was unveiled, suspiciously similar bogie wagons were drawn by suspiciously similar locomotives. After about 1890, the French lost their lead in the development of their military railways, but the Prussians and all the other German States kept revising and improving theirs. The von Tirpitz battery benefitted from all this. The D-lok, pulling the Brigadewagen, was needed to shift all that cement for defence, and then the constant supply of 280mm shells for attack, not to mention constant repairs and improvements. The drawing, courtesy of Eric Fresné, shows the early Brigadewagen.

The entrance to the establishment was guarded by a further gun, and a barrack for the Other Ranks. The officers were housed in a smaller, more discreet shelter. On its substantial concrete roof were based two anti-aircraft machine guns. The whole complex was surrounded by barbed wire to discourage too much interest from civilians. There was a substantial raid in 1916. Two guns were damaged, a claim verified by aerial photography. Repairs were rapidly effected and the battery remained active until the German retreat in late 1918. As a parting shot, the Germans laid booby-trap bombs before they left. The photo below shows sinister cables sneaking from the 280mm calibre gun running out into the sands where the detonators lurked. It also shows camouflage paint in use. Boooby-traps are not pleasant but neither is war. The more damage the Germans could do, the better the peace deal they could arrange, was their reasoning. If the Allies had had a chance to prepare such traps before the German Spring Offensive 1918, would they have behaved any differently? It was a good example of fortification used successfully. Other forts had failed under enemy attack. Sometimes they were poorly sited or their defences were outdated, sometimes they had not been properly supported or maintained.

The illustratio9sn are from the author’s collection except for the drawing by Eric Fresné See: Eric Fresné 70 années de Chemins de fer betteraviers LR Presse, Auray, France 2007 Sarah Wright Colonel Péchot: Tracks To The Trenches Birse Press 2014 Illustration Magazine Paris 9th November 1918 Eric Fresné is currently writing a book about 19th century French voie de 60 railways. We’ll supply further details in due course.