What took them so long?
We know that, privately at least, by the end of September,
von Hindenburg and von Ludendorf knew that War was lost. On September 28th,
these senior Marshals of the German Army informed the Kaiser. His comment was
‘Why didn’t you tell me a fortnight ago? Saved us all a lot of trouble.’
Yet over the next five weeks, the First
World War continued. There were over a quarter of a million
casualties, arguably more. In a more peaceful environment, the influenza
epidemic might have been better managed and less deadly. These were not just
forces of history which caused the delay. Decisions taken by men (mostly men) delayed
the Armistice.
Bulgaria
collapsed relatively quickly. The breakthrough battle happened on 15th
September, peace negotiations by the end of the month. A fuller description is
in my previous blog. The agony on the Western Front took much longer.
We can home in on the highly symbolic Somme Front. What happened
there reflected events over the whole of the western Front. The French and AEF
were also advancing but our looking glass will be trained so to speak on the Upper Somme. In 1916, during the Battle
of the Somme, the British expended much blood
and treasure on he objective of Péronne – which they never took. (See earlier
blog.) In March and early April 1918, the Germans took all but 60 kilometres –
the distance between Péronne and the eastern suburbs of Amiens. They were halted at Villers
Bretonneux a few kilometres from the strategic city. (See recent blog).
In July 1918, the Allies moved on to the front foot. On
August 8th, they took 10 kilometres (6 ½ miles) of territory in the Péronne direction.
Villers Bretonneux and Amiens were out of danger. Between the 9th
and 29th August, they advanced a further 15 kilometres to another
Villers, this time Villers Carbonnel. There they paused.
Their way to Péronne was barred by the Somme
and Canal de Somme. Before them lay the formidable Hindenburg Line which
stretched from Péronne north-west to Lens in the department of Pas de Calais. After hard fighting, they were 5
kilometres east by September 6th. A British, Canadian and ANZAC
force reached the gates of the town of St
Quentin by September 18th, but not much
beyond until October 9th.
The truism has been that the Germans traded territory for
lives, but in actual fact, they had planned the retreat as a series of strong
points. Places in between were given up under relatively little pressure, but
centres of resistance were not given up without a desperate fight. These cost
many lives, their own as well as those of the Allies.
There were reasons why the Allies were able to press home
their attack. In spite of news censorship, the Germans had their suspicions
about the course of the War. Rumour has a thousand tongues. During the advances
in the spring, they saw captured Allied supplies. The contrast between the
coarse plenty that the enemy enjoyed and their own shortages was painful. In
addition, the Germans were exhausted. They had been reinforced the previous
winter, but not since.
On the Allied side, the presence of the million-strong AEF on
their right flank was heartening. Most importantly, what enabled them to press
forward was a better educated leadership. Old-fashioned ideas of sending men
armed with bayonets to face barbed wire and machine guns had finally been
replaced. Military intelligence was being used better. Instead of a random
bombardment, an advance was being protected by a creeping barrage of artillery.
The gunfire crept forward just ahead of the infantry.
Guns were bigger, there were more of them and they were
better used.
The Army had learned to use trench railways to bring
ammunition into the field. Military shells were now enormous but the guns never
went short. Finally the French and British had learned the lessons that Prosper
Péchot had tried to teach. (See previous blogs)
A battered French bogie wagon (Pechot system) with water tanker beyond.Wagons such as these ensured that humans and guns were kept fed. Photo MD Wright |
Those contesting St Quentin, inch by painful inch, might
have been interested in what was happening at German HQ.
On September 28th, after they heard the plans for
a Bulgarian armistice, Ludendorf and Hindenburg agreed that a general armistice
should be sought. They did not approach the Kaiser until the next day. Wilhelm
II did as he was told – as he had done for quite a while. He is supposed to
have made this comment about his relationship with the two Marshals. ‘From time
to time I hear this and that has been done, according to the wishes of those
gentlemen’
A disappointing peace was now inevitable. Neither the
Marshals nor the Kaiser liked the German Reichstag (Parliament), so their
priority was not to stop the bloodshed. They started manoeuvres to ensure that Parliament
and a new administration were blamed. Thus it was not until 4th
October that Prince Max of Baden appealed to President Wilson of the USA for an
armistice. Wilson
did not reply until 14th October. He reminded the Central Powers
that the USA
entered the War for ‘the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere.’
The High Command started an argument which basically
continued until November 1st. This turned out to be rearranging the
proverbial deckchairs on the proverbial sinking ship. Was it necessary for the
Kaiser to abdicate and if so, in favour of whom?
The generals argue. Photo from' Illustration' Courtesy MD Wright |
In the meantime, the bloodshed continued. Between 8th
and 10th October, the BAC (British, Australian and Canadian) forces
sped 15 kilometres east of St Quentin, as far as the valley of the Oise. There the Germans mounted a stiff defence and held
them off until October 26th.
In the meantime, politics seemed to have stalled. The USA
may have kept the other Allies informed, but the Germans were still unwilling
to approach the French or British.
In Germany,
word of the parley with President Wilson soon got out. As Edmund Taylor put it, ‘Wilhelm’s
abdication was soon the subject of conversations and arguments everywhere, in
government offices, drawing rooms, political meetings and streetcars; everywhere
but in the press where every mention of it was censored.’ Clearly, no one told
the PBI (poor b***** infantry) who continued to slog it out in eastern France.
On 27th October, the BCA force were east of the Oise river.
On October 28th, mutiny started in the German Navy.
The Fleet had been ordered into the North Sea.
The aim had been to help evacuate German soldiers who risked being stranded on
Belgian beaches by the rapid Allied advance. Unfortunately for the High
Command, the sailors put an unfavourable interpretation on the orders. Rumours
abounded; the fleet stayed in port. An example was made of the ring-leaders but
this just turned them into martyrs.
On November 1st, mutiny was all around the ships.
By November 4th, the Red Flag (Russian!) was flying from most of the
warships and thousands of sailors were parading the streets of Kiel singing the
Marseillaise (French!)
Kurt Eisner |
On land, the BCA were making fast progress. From November 5th
to the day of the Armistice, the average distance covered, per day, was 15
kilometres. The Germans came as close as they ever did to trading territory for
lives. They still, however, took the time to destroy communications and
material as they retreated.
On November 5th, President Wilson made it clear
that Marshal Foch of France had his full approval to represent the Allies in negotiations with Germany.
On November 7th, Bavaria declared itself a Republic. Its new
President was a journalist called Kurt Eisner; his sympathies were firmly
socialist. This was really serious! The aim of this new republic was to be free
– free of the Wittelsbach dynasty which had ruled them for 700 years but also
free of the rest of Germany.
German unity was at stake. This seems to have concentrated minds.
At nine that evening, three German staff cars approached
Haudroy in Aisne. There is a monument to the
Armistice in nearby La Capelle. Each car prominently displayed a white flag.
Talks could begin. Within 24 hours, the German government had sent an Armistice
Commission to the Forest
of Compiègne to meet Marshal
Foch and his delegation.
As imagined by Georges Scott, the moment when German cars approached the French near La Capelle on November 7th. 'Illustration' magazine. Courtesy MD Wright |
Between 8th November, when the Armistice was
agreed, and the end of the war on 11th November, thousands more
lives were sacrificed. Soldiers continued to die, homes and communications were
blown up, people starved, the Spanish flu rampaged through Europe.
The story is depressing.
We should not be too angry, looking for someone to blame for
all the suffering. What happened a century ago belongs to the past. We may feel
some ignoble satisfaction when we find someone to blame, but it doesn’t do much good. Winston Churchill said
the following about another disaster. ‘If we open a quarrel between the past
and the present, we have lost the future.’ This sounds very noble and
oratorical but the attitude has important practical results.
After World War One, there were lots of recriminations on
the Allied side, firstly against Germany and then against our own
generals. On the German side, among the military at least, there was a more
useful spirit. Mistakes were made, certainly, during the last 100 days of the
War. But von Rundstedt, (1875-1953) then
a Staff Officer, remarked that many of the successful campaigns of the Second
World War were informed by the failures of the First.
In the period between the Wars, British, Australian and
Canadian generals were all blamed for not taking better care of theirsoldiers.
As they were left ‘out of the loop’ some of this is unfair. General Monash, commander of Australian troops deserves to have a University named after him.
German Brigadelok of he design used in World War 1, sold at the WW1 and lovingly restored. Photographed at Apedale by MD Wright |
As for the portable railways designed by Prosper Péchot,
they disappeared back into French Army bases. The German equivalents, the rail,
wagons and locomotives, were sold off as War Surplus to the victors.