One hundred year ago, the Germans were still on the offensive on
the Western Front. I understood why they were confident of victory in spring 1918, but always felt that
the summer offensives were a bloody waste.
Early in 1918, the German Army attacked the Western Front with
vigour. Tremendous gains were made; in late March, early April, the were almost
able to break the Front in two. British and French soldiers managed, just, to
hold the line east of Amiens.
This was a tribute to the soldiers involved.
There was another factor. The Allies were better supplied.
The Germans had to bring everything – ammunition, food, even water - and
evacuate their wounded over many kilometres of trampled, rutted and
bloodstained ground. The Allied defenders were bringing their supplies over a
few kilometres of fresh fields.
Both side depended on 60 cm gauge field railways using
portable or highly versatile track. In the case of the French, this was a
development of artillerie 88, the
system that was first adopted in 1888, and was informally known as the système Péchot in honour of Prosper
Péchot its original designer. The
Germans had their Feldbahn system,
the British, Canadians and ANZACs had developed the War Department Light
Railways (WDLR). The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had their Department of
Light Railways. When they retreated towards Amiens, WDLR operators destroyed the material
they could not take to stop it from falling into enemy hands.
Although such railways were versatile, they were more easily
laid over fresh ground – undisturbed fields and quiet country lanes.
German prefabricated track came in a range of lengths. As can be sen, it could be laid quickly, but not on extremely rough ground. Track photographed at Apedale, Staffs. Courtesy MD Wright |
The Germans continued their offensives into the summer,
trying one section of the Front after another until what had been a relatively
smooth frontier became a bulging line of excrescences where territory had been
gained at terrible cost. Yet in July
1918, General Ludendorf planned yet another attack. In German this was known as
Friedensturm which we might translate
as ‘auspicious storm’.
There was logic to the plan. The French still depended on places fortes – strategic towns which
were heavily defended. One of these, Reims, was almost surrounded. The Germans would smash the
enclave, cross the Marne and encircle Paris.
The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) building up south-east of Verdun - most celebrated
of the places fortes - would threaten
the German flank. They would therefore have to be neutralised.
It was a good plan with similarities to the offensive of
1914. The Germans had developed new arms. As well as artillery and Storm
Troopers, armed with flame-throwers, the Germans had started to deploy tanks.
Therefore the optimists in German High Command thought that this time would be
more successful than the last.
At dawn on August 15th, the people of Paris heard the enemy
guns. The threat was not far off.
Unfortunately for the Germans, they had lost the element of
surprise. A week earlier, rumours of such an attack, emanating from Alsace, reached the
French General Staff. More specific information was to reach them on the night
of the 14th. That very evening,
some prisoners gave away the time and place of the German attack. This was not
much notice, but the French had just enough time to prepare their own surprise.
Most of the Front was evacuated and troops moved back to the second and third
line of trenches so that the initial bombardment hurt no-one. A few sturdy
volunteers had dug themselves in. Equipped with machine-guns, they gave the
Germans the impression that the line of trenches was manned. As the Storm-troopers
moved forward towards the second line, they were hit by a terrific bombardment.
They took shelter in refuges – old farm buildings – many of which had been
booby trapped. The second and third line of trenches had become the new Front
and it was almost impossible to break through. The total death toll for both
sides was 45,000.
The Germans had slightly more success on their left flank
and actually crossed the Marne having gained
75 square kilometres of territory. All they had really gained was a new
salient, pressed on three sides by the Allies, broken ground, and hard to
supply – all they had was one railway. By July 19th, they retreated
beyond the Marne, leaving valuable equipment, and Paris was safe.
Late in July 1917, a French tank tows away a German gun, abandoned as they retreated. PIcture from 'Illustration' magazine courtesy MD Wright |
Why did the attack fail?
One good reason was that the French were learning how to
deal with storm-troopers, as we have seen above. Another was the AEF on their
east flank. As mentioned in previous blogs, the AEThough the AEF started
arriving in France
in 1917, their generals had, for the most part kept them back from battle until
summer 1918. When faced with fresh armies of fine strapping men, full of the
wheat and beef of the US
prairies, German soldiers felt more than somewhat discouraged. US soldiers were
formidable fighters.
Another reason was given by my dear old Granny who
experienced the First World War. ‘The spring offensives of 1918’ she would say,
‘were a big mistake. When the Germans advanced, they saw how well supplied we
were. This disheartened them’
She had a point. The Germans had been told by their
Government and media that submarine warfare had successfully cut off supplies.
The British were starving. The French, having lost territory, were in not much
better shape. If things were bad for the Central Powers, they were even worse
for the Allies.
This detail from the above picture shows the soldiers marching over a 60cm railway. As they were the same gauge, both sides made use of captured rail. From Illustration magazine courtesy MD Wright |
The Spring Offensives gave the lie to these optimistic
claims. Time and again, when the Germans occupied enemy trenches, they found
supplies aplenty. Admittedly, the food was very dull. Dear old Granny could
still remember the tins of ‘Maconochie’, containing tasteless stew and staple diet of the British Army. Also part
of the ration was plum and apple jam – usually ‘spooned’ out of the tin with a
bayonet, tasteless, perhaps, but full of calories.
The ordinary German soldier realised that he was being fed,
not with proper food but with propaganda. The Allies were not starving. One
comment about the German diet in 1918 says it all. They gave the world the word
ersatz which we still use to describe
fake and substitute food.
This may explain why the German prisoners started
co-operating. Up until 1918, German military intelligence had been, like so
much else, superior to that of the Allies. They could obtain information from
prisoners without using undue pressure. The Allies, especially the British,
were not so successful. By summer 1918, the soldiers who were captured may not
have been quite as discreet as they had been earlier in the war. This might
explain why vague Intelligence was leaked to the French from the Alsace area, and why the
vital Intelligence was gathered on the night of July 14th.
Ordinary Germans knew the game was up. Their superiors, who
ought to have known better, were prolonging the agony. What a pity that the
slaughter went on until November 1918.