From Festiniog to Péchot Bourdon to Brigadelok

Prosper Péchot (1849-1928) was moved to discuss the the increasing sophistication of German military 60cm 'field' railways, developed after he had designed a system for the French. His discussion is quite interesting because, apart from technical manuals, he didn't write very much. His memorial has been his works rather than his words. This makes a series of lectures - which resulted in a book - particularly revealing. They were recorded almost verbatim as he spoke, but I have somewhat abbreviated and simplified the convoluted 19th century diction. I'd like to persuade you that, as well as his views on military narrow gauge, they help tell us about his character, so well hidden under the uniform of an officer in the French Artillery.

This photo of Colonel Péchot was taken in 1907, on his retirement. Although he was awarded the Legion of Honour and was known to the top politicians of France, he was caring and modest. Courtesy Raymond PECHOT

The text is taken from a short course delivered in 1903 (25th to 27th April) to students at the school of ponts et chaussées et des mines - the central State University for civil engineers. Péchot was there to discuss the subject of derailment, an ever-present danger for trains of all gauges. He was there as an expert, celebrated for introducing 60cm as an official railway gauge, both for military use around places fortes/frontier defenses and for civilian railways.

'Gentlemen' he began, 'I was invited here by the Minister of Works himself, the aim being to help you understand railways - with a focus on how design can help to avoid derailments. My examples are taken from the work I was encouraged to do in organising 60 cm gauge for military purposes'

The word 'I' appears three times in the original French paragraph. They are less a statement of 'ego' and more a description of self as part of a group.  'I' and 'was invited' are separated by several lines in the original text and 'invited' in the French suggests 'we are invited' - Invités is the plural form. Was he suggesting that he was there as part of a team, or that the 'we' included the students, or was this suggesting both? Another  'I' is even more interesting - the original French goes 'Je suis amené/I was led' (which has been translated 'I was encouraged'). Who led Prosper Péchot? The Army was somewhat discouraging. They tried to bury his original proposals. When Decauville appeared, ready to lend them the bogies and prefabricated track for trials. they tried to remove Péchot from the trials as fast as possible. He was too 'partisan'. Even when the Minister for Defence took an interest in the Péchot project, his superiors made sure that he was never posted anywhere near Toul. At the time of the talks, Péchot was serving in remore Castres, over 600 kilometres from Paris, even more from Toul. Yet he always considered himself part of a team.

He goes on. 'This is the problem I had to resolve when, in 1882, I had to design a 60cm system: how to transport the food, ammunition and all other necessities for an army to work efficiently, on time and to the right place in the field, regardless of the distance from the nearest railway'

The reason why 'he had to' was because of his Staff College thesis. This was a standard theoretical essay, set to all students - retake Metz in the Provinces lost to Germany. The city was surrounded by well-armed forts and the nearest railways that any invaders had a hope of capturing were about 15 kilometres away, a long march, even without artillery. One assumes that most of the officers at Staff College put their stress on 'cran et élan' - courage and sheer guts. Péchot put his faith in big guns, and lots of ammunition.

'Transport must be improved' he explained. 'The history of any siege shows that the lack of efficient transport (he uses the word puissant/powerful several times) has caused failure or near-failure. The defenders have been able to call on more and better arms than their attackers. The siege of Paris (war of 1870-1) provides a good lesson . The Prussian army took 104 days to bring up enough ammunition to begin a bombardment. Between 23st December 1870 and 28th January 1871, the guns were active on 20 days and Paris actually capitulated because of hunger, not shelling. 300 tonnes of ammunition were expended. It had taken the Prussians a lot of effort to transport this comparatively meagre amount from their railhead at Nanteuil (eastern Paris) to Villacoublay in the west where the best vantage point for gunnery was situated. They had no less than 1000 commandeered horse wagons; the work was made easier when they re-opened the railway tunnel past Nanteuil and reduced each journey from 70 to 48 kilometres. To add insult to injury, when the victors withdrew, they left the roads around Paris in a ruinous state.

It is clear that a new form of transport was needed' It was clear to Péchot but, not it appears, to the rest of the Army.

'This new transport' he continued, 'must be able to carry heavy guns. It must not expose our boys to the dangers of trans-shipping from one gauge to another within range of enemy guns. (Many strategists of the time believed that for a significant operation, a standard gauge railway should be built to as near the war zone as possible.) It must therefore be able to carry items quite a distance. The wagons should be designed to make unloading as simple as possible. It should be quick and simple to be put into operation. It should be able to carry significant tonnages - ammunition as well as 'one-offs' like guns. It should be adaptible enough to be used in our own forts as well as for attack.

'The best system uses locomotive-hauled trains on railways.' Péchot explained. To carry the guns and amunition for a respectable siege park would require either 160 train journeys, or 210,000 horse journeys (assuming that the cart of the period could carry 4 tonnes). 'I have been looking at the problem since 1878. The automobiles (cars and trucks) of the time can carry between one and three tonnes of freight, and so they are not an answer either.

The Péchot Bourdon locomotive was a development of the Welsh Fairlie, but is far more than just a compact version. It featured seven important improvements. Photo courtesy of Raymond Duton.

 Such a railway system must be able to carry up to 48 tonnes. (Péchot put a lot of energy into devising a series of bogies which could carry a 48 tonne gun. His imitators found other ways round that particular problem). The system must be based on a gauge that is smaller than standard or metre gauge, both of which need considerable civil engineering, for building the railways and the unloading points. Standard and metre gauge would be unsuitable for use within our own places fortes. (This was an important point. The Sappers wanted to use metre gauge for strategic transport in the open air and 40cm inside their forts - with a nasty dangerous trans-shipment point at every gateway!) At the same time, 50cm gauge or anything less is also impractical because studies have shown that it could not carry the tonnage required. This only leaves 60cm gauge. Here we have an encouraging example - the Festiniog Railway of Wales. By 1882, the Fairlies of the Festiniog were carrying significant loads at speeds of up to 64 km/h (40mph). It must be rail, the gauge must be 60cm and the locomotives used could be an adapted version of the Fairlie'

With help from Decauville (not his superiors!) Péchot had done a lot of work on the 60cm track required. Once again, he just said 'Nous fümes conduit à reconaître/We are led to the conclusion' before explaining the unique qualities of Péchot track. These words demonstrate his tact and modesty.

'Portable track had to be in prefabricated lengths and made entirely of steel. They had to respect the official maximum that a man could carry - 50 kg. A 5m length, to be carried by four men, must weigh no more than 170 kg. The track had to be simple to lay, therefore prefabricated. On the other hand, it had to support an axle-loading of 3.5 tonnes, the minimum necessary for the trains and their locomotives. The system could be used in the field to supply an attacking army but is equally useful for the defence. In the field' he went on, 'regular trains would supply food and ammunition as went all transporting the big guns. A distance of up to 10 km from the nearest standard gauge railhead could efficiently supply two to three thousand tonnes of supplies daily.'

Péchot then reminded his listeners that at many points during their campaign of 1870-1, the Prussians had been a day or so from meltdown. Thus, they were watching our trials of 1888. By 1891, they were trialling a version of 60cm 'analogous to ours/ analogue au nôtre qu'ils voyaient fonctionner depuis 1888'. 'In 1893, they put designs into production;  by now (1903) they have at least 1000 km of track alone, plus wagons and locomotives. Exercises undertaken by the German Army show that 10 kilometres of 60 cm track can be laid every day'

This restored example of a German Brigadelok (0-8-0T) was photographed at Apedale in 1914.  Between 1904 and 1918, approximately 2000 were built - German authorities tend to qualify their numbers with etwas/thereabouts. No doubt at the end of the war, they deliberately kept numbers vague - the more the victorious French knew that they had, the more that they would demand in reparations! Until 1904, German field railways kept axle-loading below 3-5 tonnes, just like the French, but with this new design, they began to use conventionally laid track. Photo by Malcolm Wright

Péchot assured his listeners that German material was inferior to the French. By 1903, this was a matter of opinion. By 1914, it was no longer true.